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Abstract
A privacy-utility tradeoff is developed for an arbitrary set of finite-alphabet source distributions. Privacy is
quantified using differential privacy (DP), and utility is quantified using expected Hamming distortion maximized
over the set of distributions. The family of source distribution sets (source sets) is categorized into three classes,
based on different levels of prior knowledge they capture. For source sets whose convex hull includes the uniform
distribution, symmetric DP mechanisms are optimal. For source sets whose probability values have a fixed monotonic
ordering, asymmetric DP mechanisms are optimal. For all other source sets, general upper and lower bounds on
the optimal privacy leakage are developed and a necessary and sufficient condition for tightness are established.
Differentially private leakage is an upper bound on mutual information (MI) leakage: the two criteria are compared
analytically and numerically to illustrate the effect of adopting a stronger privacy criterion.
Index Terms
Differential privacy, Hamming distortion, information leakage, utility-privacy tradeoff
I. INTRODUCTION
The differential privacy (DP) framework offers strong guarantees on the risk of identifying an individual’s presence
in a database from public disclosures of functions of that database [3]. This metric has been applied to a variety of
computational tasks where privacy guarantees are required, especially in theoretical computer science, databases, and
machine learning. The monograph of Dwork and Roth [4] gives an in-depth treatment of the fundamentals; a short
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2tutorial for signal processing applications introduces basic concepts . Under differential privacy, randomizing the
computation limits the privacy risk, or leakage, due to revealing the result of the computation. This randomization
often incurs a significant penalty in terms of the usefulness of the published result: this is known as the privacy-
utility tradeoff. Differential privacy is a property of the distribution of the computation’s output conditioned on its
input, which can be modeled information-theoretically as a noisy channel. In this paper we seek to understand the
distortion properties of channels that guarantee differential privacy: this is the privacy-utility tradeoff for the task of
publishing a differentially private approximation of the full dataset with utility quantified via a distortion measure.
The DP framework makes no modeling assumptions on the data distribution and gives distribution-independent
privacy guarantees. However, in many applications a data published may know something a priori about the data
distribution. For example, they may know that some elements of the alphabet have a higher probability, or may
know something about the distribution up to the labeling of the alphabet.
There are many instances in which a data holder may be required to publish a version of the underlying data. To
capture the data holder’s knowledge, we assume they know the true distribution lies in an uncertainty set or source
set of distributions but do not know the true distribution exactly. This knowledge could come from previously
published population statistics, public data or estimation from the source itself, with the uncertainty set represented
by confidence intervals. To match the spirit of DP models, we do not assume a Bayesian prior on the set of
distributions.
In order to measure the effect of this uncertainty, we model utility as the maximum Hamming distortion over
the entire source set. Many datasets contain categorical data for which Hamming distortion is a natural metric
and previously studied privacy mechanisms using additive noise make less sense [6]: Hamming distortion captures
whether the original data was altered or not. We show that the optimal mechanism guarantees the minimal leakage
by effectively censoring low-probability symbols (which are hardest to protect).
A. Our Contributions
This paper extends our previous results on binary sources [2] to general finite alphabets under Hamming distortion.
Larger alphabet sizes permit more complex structures for source sets. The following are our main contributions:
1) We categorize source distributions as belonging to one of three possible source classes as illustrated in Figure
1 for which different DP mechanisms are optimal.
• Class I: Source distribution sets whose convex hull includes the uniform distribution. For example, see the
blue source set in Figure 1.
For Class I sources we show that the symmetric mechanism is optimal. Intuitively, this is because knowing
that we have a class I source set does not give the data publisher any advantage compared to not know-
ing anything at all about the source distribution. Therefore, guaranteeing both utility and privacy for all
distributions requires a symmetric privacy mapping.
• Class II: Source distribution sets that are not Class I, and have ordered probability values. That is, there is a
permutation of the alphabet such that all distributions in the class have monotonically decreasing probability
mass functions for this permutation. For example, in Figure 1, we have P1 ≥ P2 ≥ P3.
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3We show how to exploit the ordering to characterize optimal non-symmetric mechanisms for the distribution.
As the distortion increases, the optimal mechanism reduces the support size of the output set by mapping
low-probability elements to high probability events. We can think of these low-probability events as outliers:
since they are most informative (from a privacy perspective), they can be censored in the output to guarantee
more privacy.
• Class III: All source distribution sets that cannot be classified as Class I or Class II. An example is depicted
in Figure 1.
We first show that any arbitrary source set can be written as a disjoint union of Class II subsets, each having
a different ordering, and use the characterization of Class II mechanisms to derive upper and lower bounds
on the privacy leakage.
2) We show that the structure of the conditional probability (channel) matrix of optimal mechanisms depends on
the location of what we call critical pairs: two elements in the same column with maximum ratio.
3) We show how the worst-case guarantee of differentially private leakage compares to average-case guarantee
of mutual information (MI) leakage. Under standard DP, the mechanism is context-free in the sense that the
guarantees do not rely on source distribution assumptions. This leakage upper bounds the context-aware MI
leakage, whose guarantees depend on the source distribution [7], [8]. This work shows how context-awareness
can improve the utility of DP mechanisms and how the gap between the MI leakage and its DP leakage
upper bound varies. To do this we study the min-max problems under DP and MI to derive bounds and
compute numerical comparisons. To this end, we formulate the same min-max optimization problem proposed
to compute DP mechanisms to determine optimal mechanisms in MI privacy guarantees. We formulate the
same min-max optimization problem using mutual information as the privacy metric. Then, we show that for
certain ranges of distortion we can obtain tight bounds and we present numerical comparison.
 
 
𝑃1 
𝑃3 
𝑃2 
Class I 𝒫 
Class II 𝒫 
Class III 𝒫 
Fig. 1: All three classes of source sets for M = 3.
B. Related Work
There is a growing body of work on differential privacy (DP) the survey of which is beyond the scope of this
paper; we refer the curious reader to the monograph [4]. However, comparing differential privacy to other statistical
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4privacy models is a more recent area of study.
Mutual information has been proposed as a metric for privacy leakage [9]–[11] in a variety of settings including
data communications, publishing, and mining. Takbiri et al. [12]–[14] used mutual information to obtain the
fundamental limits of privacy in IoT (Internet of Things) devices. One of the earliest works comparing differential
privacy and mutual information privacy is by Alvim et. al. [15], [16]. Mutual information based privacy metrics
have also been considered for data streaming applications [17]–[19]. Wang et al. [20] compare mutual information
privacy with differential privacy under Hamming distortion. They also introduce a new privacy measure called
identifiability and highlight its relationship to MI and DP. Building upon prior work [15], Issa et al. have introduced
maximal leakage (ML) as an information leakage measure for a guessing adversary [21]; this measure can also be
compared to DP. Cuff and Yu [22] present an equivalent definition of differential privacy using mutual information.
In this paper we consider utility metrics based on rate-distortion in Section III-A. A rate-distortion approach to
mutual information privacy has been also considered by many researchers [7], [23]–[25]; this paper extends our
prior work in this direction [26].
Local differential privacy (L-DP) [27]–[31] studies scenarios in which each data respondent, independently
applies the same privacy mechanism. Recently, Kairouz et al. [32] determined the optimal local differential privacy
mechanism for a class of utility functions that satisfy a sub-linearity property and show that the resulting L-DP
mechanism has a staircase property, meaning that the ratio of any two conditional probabilities leading to same
outputs is in {1, c, c−1}, where c is some constant. However, while Hamming distortion is a sub-linear utility
function, the worst case distortion over a source class is not. We show that the staircase property holds only for
Class 1 source sets.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM SETUP
Let X represent data value alphabet for each individual. For example, X can represent a single attribute or a
Cartesian product of other alphabet sets, i.e. X = ∏Kk=1 Xk, where Xk is the set of possible values for kth attribute
measured about an individual. Without loss of generality, we assume X = {1, 2, 3, . . . ,M}. A source distribution
set (source set) P is a subset of probability simplex on M atoms. We model the data of individuals as being drawn
from a distribution PX ⊂ P on X , but our solutions can depend on P and not the particular PX is not known a
priori.
Given an individual’s data X ∈ X , our goal is to find a conditional distribution QXˆ|X that maps the input data
X to an output data Xˆ ∈ Xˆ . Our objective is to find a QXˆ|X that is both privacy preserving and does not distort
the data above some threshold. For any PX ∈ P , let QXˆ|X and PX,Xˆ = PXQXˆ|X indicate the mechanism and the
joint distribution of input and output data, respectively. When it is clear from context, we may drop the subscripts
and simply use P and Q instead of PX and QXˆ|X . We write Pi for PX(X = i) for i ∈ X .
Let T be a permutation on {1, . . . ,M}, such that T (i) is the ith element in the permuted sequence, and T−1(j)
is the index of element j in the permuted sequence. Throughout the sequel, we also refer to the permuted version
of a source distribution P as T (P ), which is a distribution Pˆ such that for all i, we have PˆT (i) = Pi. Likewise,
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5we write T−1(P) to denote the inverse of T applied to P . The notation T (P) (respectively T−1(P)) is the image
of P (respectively T (P)) when T (respectively T−1) is applied to every P ∈ P .
A. Classification of source distribution sets
We divide the set of source distribution sets into three classes.
Definition 1: A source set P is classified as follows:
• A source set P is of Class I if its convex hull conv(P) includes the uniform distribution Pi = 1M for all
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}.
• A source set P is of Class II if it is not Class I and there exists a single permutation T (·) such that for every
distribution P = (P1, P2, P3, . . . , PM ) ∈ P , we have PT (1) ≥ PT (2) ≥ PT (3) ≥ · · · ≥ PT (M).
• Any other source set is defined to be of Class III.
Remark 1: Without loss of generality, for Class II source sets we assume P1 ≥ P2 ≥ . . . ≥ PM .
We now provide some examples for source sets in Classes II and III defined above. These examples are used in
Section IV to derive numerical comparisons between different source classes.
Example 1: In a Class II set, all source distributions have entries (as vectors) ordered in the same way. For
example, a P containing a single distribution, such as P(6)II shown in Table I for M = 6, is a Class II set. A line
segment between two distributions with the same order is a Class II set. An example P(10)II for M = 10 is given
in Table II: the line segment between the two rows is a Class II set.
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6
0.7 0.15 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.02
TABLE I: P(6)II with M = 6
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10
0.3 0.2 0.15 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02
0.35 0.16 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01
TABLE II: P(10)II with M = 10
Example 2: One way to generate a Class III source set is by taking the unions of Class II sets and (some of)
their permutations. Examples based on P(6)II and P(10)II are shown in Tables III and IV. Specifically, we created
three additional distributions for each Class II distribution considered by permuting the entries in three different
ways to obtain additional distributions. We label these resulting sets as P(i)III: a, P(i)III: b, and P(i)III: c, where i ∈ {6, 10}.
Thus, for example, to generate P(6)III: a we consider both the original P(6)II and a permuted version of it obtained
by swapping the first and second entries of P(6)II . To obtain P(6)III: b, we permute the first and third entries of P(6)II
and add this to the set P(6)III: a. Finally, the set P(6)III: c is obtained by adding to the set P(6)III: b the new distribution
obtained by permuting the first and fourth entries of P(6)II . One can similarly construct the sets P(10)III: a ,P(10)III: b, and
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6P(10)III: c by permuting the first and second, first and third, and first and fourth entries of P(10)II , respectively. These
sets are highlighted in Tables III and IV with their entries denoted by the groupings a, b, and c. Clearly, for both
the M = 6 and M = 10 cases, the number of entries increases from (a) to (c) reflecting less and less structured
sets.
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6
c

b

a
 0.7 0.15 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.020.15 0.7 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.02
0.06 0.15 0.7 0.04 0.03 0.02
0.04 0.15 0.06 0.7 0.03 0.02
TABLE III: P(6)III: a, P(6)III: b, and P(6)III: c with M = 6.
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10
c

b

a

0.3 0.2 0.15 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02
0.35 0.16 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01
0.2 0.3 0.15 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02
0.16 0.35 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01
0.15 0.2 0.3 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02
0.12 0.16 0.35 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01
0.08 0.2 0.15 0.3 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02
0.10 0.16 0.12 0.35 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01
TABLE IV: P(10)III: a , P(10)III: b, and P(10)III: c with M = 10.
B. Distortion measure
We measure the distortion between X and Xˆ using Hamming distortion, i.e. d(x, y) = 1 if x 6= y, and d(x, y) = 0
if x = y.
Since Hamming distortion imposes a penalty when the published data is different from the original, it suffices
to limit our search for optimal mechanisms to those with an output support set at most equal to M . We formally
prove this in Section III. Hamming distortion is particularly meaningful for categorical data in which there may be
no natural metric: any difference captures a semantic difference.
We show later that the output alphabet size is at most M as well, depending on the distortion, so X = Xˆ .
The average distortion is then given as EX,Xˆ [d(X, Xˆ)]. To indicate the dependence of the average distortion on
the source distribution and the mechanism we write EPX ,QXˆ|X [d(X, Xˆ)]. For Hamming distortion, the average
distortion is
∑M
i=1 Pi(1 − Q(i|i)). Thus, we can simplify the Q matrix by defining Di = 1 − Q(i|i) for all i.
Henceforth, it suffices to consider mechanisms Q(j|i) with the following form:
[QXˆ|X ]ij =

1−D1 Q(2|1) . . . Q(M |1)
Q(1|2) 1−D2 . . . Q(M |2)
...
...
. . .
...
Q(1|M) Q(2|M) . . . 1−DM
 .
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jmax|imin : imax).
Definition 2: A mechanism QXˆ|X , or equivalently its corresponding distortion set {Di}Mi=1, is called (P, D)-valid
if it satisfies the average distortion constraint for every PX ∈ P . The set of all (P, D)-valid mechanisms is
Q(P, D) ,
{
QXˆ|X : E
[
d(X, Xˆ)
]
≤ D, ∀PX ∈ P
}
.
C. Local differential privacy
We use the same model for local differential privacy as Kairouz et al. [32]. We borrow the formalization
by Kasiviswanathan et al. [29], which was based on the randomized response mechanism of Warner [27] and
Evfimievski et al. [28]. It is stronger than non-local privacy [33] and implies local -differential privacy [32], but
allows for columns of Q to be all-0:
Definition 3: A mechanism QXˆ|X is -differentially private (-DP) if
Q(xˆ|x1) ≤ eQ(xˆ|x2) for all x1, x2 ∈ X , xˆ ∈ Xˆ , (1)
and
DP(QXˆ|X) , min
{
 : Q(xˆ|x1) ≤ eQ(xˆ|x2)
for all x1, x2 ∈ X , xˆ ∈ Xˆ
}
.
(2)
Remark 2: Note that the privacy parameter  does not depend on the source class P .
Remark 3: For a finite  > 0, an -differentially private mechanism is such that every column has either all non-
zero or all zero entries, i.e. there cannot be a zero and a non-zero entry in the same column. Thus, any mechanism
achieving a finite DP(·) can have M−k non-zero columns and k all-zero columns for some integer 0 ≤ k ≤M−1.
Also note that DP(QXˆ|X) ≥ 0 for any QXˆ|X .
Note that D = 0 (perfect utility) implies that Xˆ = X , i.e. the optimal mechanism is an identity matrix Q with
DP(Q) =∞. Thus, we focus only on D > 0 in the sequel.
Lemma 1: DP(·) is quasi-convex in QXˆ|X , where quasi-convexity is defined according to [34, Section 3.4.1].
Equivalently [34, Section 3.4.2], for all Q1, Q2, and λ ∈ [0, 1] we have
DP(λQ1 + (1− λ)Q2) ≤ max{DP(Q1), DP(Q2)}. (3)
The proof is given in Section V-A.
From Definitions 2 and 3, the minimal achievable -DP for a given distribution set under Hamming distortion is
defined as follows.
Definition 4: For a source distribution set P , and a distortion D, where 0 < D ≤ 1, let
∗DP(P, D) , min
QXˆ|X∈Q(P,D)
DP(QXˆ|X). (4)
Also denote the set of all Q ∈ Q(P, D) that achieve (4) by Q∗(P, D).
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The worst-case distortion for a mechanism Q is maxP∈P
∑M
i=1 PiDi. Since 
∗
DP(P, D) is decreasing in D,
instead of minimizing leakage for a limited worst-case distortion, we can minimize worst-case distortion for limited
leakage. Hence, one can formulate the optimization problem in (4) as
min
Q∈Q
max
P∈P
M∑
i=1
PiDi = max
Q∈Q
U(Q), (5)
where utility U(Q) = −maxP∈P
∑M
i=1 PiDi, and Q is the set of all -DP mechanisms.
Kairouz et al. [32] show the optimality of staircase mechanisms for U satisfying U(γQ) = γU(Q) and U(Q1 +
Q2) ≤ U(Q1) + U(Q2); they call such U sub-linear. We show by example that our utility is not sub-linear. Let
M = 2 and consider two mechanisms Q1 and Q2 with distortions D(1) = {1, 0} and D(2) = {0, 1} respectively,
as well as a source set P = {P (1) = (1, 0), P (2) = (0, 1)}. Then:
−max
P∈P
M∑
i=1
Pi
(
D
(1)
i +D
(2)
i
)
> −max
P∈P
M∑
i=1
PiD
(1)
i −max
P∈P
M∑
i=1
PiD
(2)
i . (6)
III. MAIN RESULTS
In the prior work in [1], the authors conjecture that the optimal differentially private (DP) mechanism for a
discrete source of alphabet size M and distortion level D is
QD(j|i) ,
1−D, i = jD
M−1 , i 6= j
. (7)
In the following, we show that the achievable scheme in (7) is tight for Class I source classes; for the Class II source
sets, we exactly characterize ∗DP(P, D) and show that it matches to that of (7) for well-defined subsets of D ∈ (0, 1],
specifically for high and low utility regimes. Finally, we characterize the optimal leakage for Class III source sets
of any other form. Note that, ∗DP(P, D) = 0 is achievable for D ≥ M−1M by Q(j|i) = 1M , 1 ≤ i ≤M, 1 ≤ j ≤M ,
for any source set of any class.
Lemma 2: Under Hamming distortion, the minimal leakage of P is the same as the minimal leakage of the
convex hull of P .
The proof is given in Section V-C. Hence, we can always assume P is convex.
The following lemma shows that it suffices to limit our search for optimal mechanisms to only those with output
support set sizes at most equal to M . Therefore, we focus on only such mechanisms throughout the rest of this
article
Lemma 3: For a source set P , there exists an optimal mechanism with an output alphabet Xˆ satisfying |Xˆ | ≤M .
The proof is given in Section V-B.
Lemma 4: For a source set P of Class II (without loss of generality let P1 ≥ P2 ≥ · · · ≥ PM for any P ∈ P ,
there exists an optimal mechanism whose corresponding set of {Di} satisfy D1 ≤ D2 ≤ · · · ≤ DM .
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Theorem 1: For any source set P of Class I, we have
∗DP(P, D) =
log(M − 1)
1−D
D , D ∈ [0, M−1M ),
0, D ∈ [M−1M , 1].
(8)
For a full proof see Section V-E. Since the source set includes the uniform point, i.e. the worst distribution, there
is no choice other than applying a symmetric mechanism as if there is no knowledge available.
We now proceed to Class II source sets, where there is a known order on the probability of each outcome. For
such source sets, we use a coloring argument on the entries of Q to prove specific properties that hold for any
optimal mechanism. This, in turn, helps us to reduce the dimension of the feasible space and derive the optimal
leakage in terms of a minimization over only M diagonal entries of the mechanism. This is formally stated in the
next Theorem.
Since utility is a statistical quantity, the statistical knowledge about the source class can be exploited to obtain a
better mechanism than the symmetric one. As the distortion increases, i.e. lower utility is allowed, the size of the
output space can decrease. Conversely, for increasing utility, i.e. decreasing distortion, the output space cannot be
smaller than a certain size. This leads to a collection of distortion thresholds D(k) at which an additional decrease
in output size becomes optimal.
In addition to this observation, we also use the properties of -DP, and in fact properties of any optimal mechanism,
to reduce the dimension of the feasible space from M2 to just M entries.
Theorem 2: For a Class II source set P with ordered statistics:
(a) There is no (P, D)-valid mechanism with k or more all-zero columns for D < D(k), where D0 , 0 and
D(k) , max
P∈P
M∑
i=M−k+1
Pi, 1 ≤ k ≤M. (9)
(b) The optimal leakage is
∗DP(P, D) =
log
(
(M − 1) 1−DD
)
, 0 < D < D(1) ,
min
l∈{0,1,...k}

(l)∗
DP:II(P, D),
D(k) ≤ D < D(k+1),
k ∈ {1, . . . ,M − 2}
0, D(M−1) ≤ D ≤ 1 ,
(10)
where (l)
∗
DP:II(P, D) is the minimum leakage achievable over all (P, D)-valid mechanisms with exactly l columns
with all zero elements and M − l columns with positive elements, formally defined as
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
(l)∗
DP:II(P, D) ,
min
{Di}M−li=1
log(M − 1− l)1−
∑M−l
i=2 Di
M−1−l
D1
subject to

∑M−l
i=1 PiDi ≤ D −D(l),∀P ∈ P,∑M−l
i=1 Di ≤M − 1− l,
Di ∈ [0, 1],∀1 ≤ i ≤M − l,
(11)
and the subscript DP:II in (10) and (11) denote the Class II source set.
For a detailed proof see Section V-F. Note that each column of a mechanism Q with finite DP(Q) has elements
that are either all zero, or all positive. The proof hinges on the fact that for a Class II source set, where we have
a complete knowledge on the order of the source distribution probabilities, only mechanisms with specific number
of all-zero columns can be feasible for a given distortion D. This limitation, together with some properties of the
DP(·) function, result in a specific structure imposed on the optimal mechanism. Therefore, the dimension of the
variable space that we need to optimize over reduces to only M instead of M2.
We now consider the Class III source sets. We show that the optimal mechanism for Class III source sets can
be obtained from results for Class II source sets. As a first step to presenting the main result for Class III source
sets, we introduce the following notation and definitions.
Let S0 be the set of all Class II distributions with decreasingly ordered probabilities. Formally,
S0 , {P : P1 ≥ P2 ≥ . . . ≥ PM}. (12)
Note that the simplex of distributions can be partitioned into M ! such ordered subsets, one for each permutation
of {1, . . . ,M}, and thus, there are a total of M !− 1 other subregions similar to S0. For example, for M = 3, as
shown in Figure 2, the simplex is a union of six disjoint ordered sets. More generally, a subset P of the simplex is
a union of distributions P that lie in one or more ordered partitions. For a source distribution P belonging to any
one of these partitions, there exists a corresponding folding permutation T such that PT (1) ≥ PT (2) ≥ . . . ≥ PT (M),
or equivalently T (P ) ∈ S0. Specifically, any Class III source set P can be written as a disjoint union of Class II
source sets using what we call folding permutations.
Definition 5: Given a Class III source set P , its folding permutation set TP is the set of all permutations T , for
which there exists at least one P ∈ P with PT (1) ≥ PT (2) ≥ · · · ≥ PT (M). Then, for each T ∈ TP define
P|T , {P ∈ P : PT (1) ≥ PT (2) ≥ · · · ≥ PT (M)}. (13)
Thus, a Class III source set P is a union of Class II source sets, i.e. P = ∪
T∈TP
P|T . For example, the source
set P in Fig. 3 lies in three partitions, with corresponding folding permutations T1, T2, and T3. Thus, P|Ti is the
intersection of P with the partition whose folding permutation is Ti, i = 1, 2, 3, such that P = P|T1 ∪P|T2 ∪P|T3 .
Without loss of generality, we only focus on those Class III source sets P that have a non-empty intersection
with S0. This is due to the fact that for any other Class III source set, the optimal mechanism can be found using
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a similar analysis with appropriate change of indices. We now show that for any such Class III source set P , the
optimal leakage can be bounded using the result in Theorem 2. We do so by mapping each P|T into S0, using its
corresponding permutation.
Definition 6: For any permutation function T ∈ TP , we define a folded equivalent of P|T as its mapped image
to S0, defined as
P|T ,
{
P ∈ S0 : ∃P ∈ P|T s.t. P = T (P )
}
. (14)
Furthermore, let
P∩ , ∩
T∈TP
P|T , P∪ , ∪
T∈TP
P|T . (15)
Clearly, P∩ ⊆ P∪ ⊆ S0, and thus, P∩ and P∪ are Class II source sets. This is depicted in Figure 3.
P1
P3
P2
Class III 𝒫
𝓢𝟎
𝓟ቚ
𝑻𝟏
𝓟ቚ
𝑻𝟐
𝓟ቚ
𝑻𝟑
Fig. 2: A Class III source set P .
P1
P3
P2𝒮0
∪
P1
P3
P2𝒮0
∩
Fig. 3: a Class III source set P .
We now proceed to our main result for Class III source sets.
Theorem 3: Let P be a Class III source set, such that P∩ and P∪ are non-empty. Then
∗DP:III(P∩, D, TP) ≤ ∗DP(P, D) ≤ ∗DP:III(P∪, D, TP), (16)
August 2, 2018 DRAFT
12
where for any Class II source set PII and a folding permutation set T we have:
∗DP:III(PII, D, T ) ,
log
(
(M − 1) 1−DD
)
, 0 < D < D(1) ,
min
l∈{0,1,...M}

(l)∗
DP:III(PII, D, T ), D(1) ≤ D < M−1M ,
0, M−1
M ≤ D ≤ 1 ,
(17)
with

(k)∗
DP:III(PII, D, T ) ,
min
{Di}M−ki=1
log(M − 1− k)1−
∑M−k
i=2 Di
M−1−k
D1
subject to

∑M−k
i=1 PiDi ≤ D −D(k), ∀P ∈ PII,∑M−k
i=1 Di ≤M − 1− k,
DT (i) = Di, ∀ T ∈ T , 1 ≤ i ≤M,
Di ∈ [0, 1], ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤M.
(18)
See Section V-G for a detailed proof. For any Class III source set, one can determine P∩ and P∪ located inside
S0, as shown in Figure 3. The bound results from focusing on P∩ and P∪, and mapping them back using the
inverses of all permutations in TP . The union of all these mapped sets forms PLB and PUB, which is contained in
and contains P , respectively. However, PLB and PUB have this specific property that their corresponding leakage
can be calculated from applying Theorem 2 on P∩ and P∪, with an additional constraint of Di = DT (i), for all
1 ≤ i ≤M and T ∈ TP .
Remark 4: In the special case where P∩ = ∅, ∗DP(P, D) can be simply lower bounded by ∗DP(P ∩ S0, D).
Remark 5: Observe that (k)
∗
DP:II in (11) and 
(k)∗
DP:III in (18) differ in an additional constraint. This comes from the
fact that the image of PLB and PUB in each Class II partition is similar, and therefore, forces some distortion values
to be equal.
Corollary 1: For P∩ = P∪, we have
∗DP(P∩, D) = ∗DP(P, D) = ∗DP(P∪, D). (19)
Remark 6: If P∩ = P∪, then the upper and lower bound match, and the minimal leakage is equal to that of P∩
obtained by Theorem 2, with the additional constraint Di = DT (i), for all 1 ≤ i ≤M and T ∈ TP .
Finally, note that the solutions provided in Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 are found by solving a linear program
for fixed D1. This simplifies the optimization considerably for large M : a naı¨ve exhaustive search over Θ(M2)
options is reduced to Θ(M). These formulations are exploited in Section IV to provide intuition comparing Class
I, II, and III source sets.
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A. Information theoretic leakage
Another metric used for leakage is the mutual information between the original and released data, often referred
to as “mutual information (MI) leakage”. Unlike DP leakage that provides worst case guarantees, MI leakage
provides average case guarantees for all entries of a dataset by taking the statistics of the data into account. Another
difference between the two is the fact that for any given mechanism, the MI leakage is not only a function of the
mechanism PXˆ|X , but also it is dependent on the specific data distribution PX . For known source distributions,
mutual information leakage is studied in [7], [23], [26], where both asymptotic and non-asymptotic results are
derived. However, for the case wherein the source distribution is not known precisely, but some knowledge of
source distribution is available, then the worst-case MI leakage of any mechanism Q is defined in [1] as:
IT(Q) = max
P∈P
I(P ;Q), (20)
such that the minimal mutual information leakage is defined as
∗IT(P, D) = min
Q∈Q(P,D)
IT(Q) = min
Q∈Q(P,D)
max
P∈P
I(P ;Q). (21)
Note that it is not in general straightforward to get analytical closed form results for ∗IT(P, D) for any P and a
desired utility function. However, we can characterize its general behavior and use that to make comparisons with
DP. Since any mechanism Q that is (P, D)-valid for two source distributions P1 and P2, is also valid for any convex
combination of P1 and P2 as well, any source distribution set P can be replaced with its convex hull without loss
of generality. As a result, the set of valid mechanisms Q(P, D) is also convex. Also note that both P and Q(P, D)
are compact, i.e. closed and bounded, and mutual information is convex in conditional distribution and convex in
source distribution. Therefore, according to the minimax theorem [35] we can conclude that the minimax inequality
holds as equality and we have:
∗IT(P, D) = min
Q∈Q(P,D)
max
P∈P
I(P ;Q)
= max
P∈P
min
Q∈Q(P,D)
I(P ;Q). (22)
We stress that MI leakage and DP leakage reflect two very different privacy sensitivity models; in particular, DP
leakage is always an upper bound on MI leakage. Therefore, for a common utility function, and a given source set,
it is worthwhile to compare their performance. To this end, we present some analytical results under MI leakage
for source classes I and II.
Lemma 5: For any Class I source set P , we have
∗IT(P, D) =
logM −H(D)−D log(M − 1), D <
M−1
M ,
0, D ≥ M−1M .
(23)
Proof: We first show that ∗IT(P, D) = 0, if D ≥ M−1M . Consider the mechanism which maps every letter of
the input alphabet to the first letter. This mechanism results in a distortion of M−1M and achieves 
∗
IT(P, D) = 0,
because the resulting output distribution is totally independent of the input.
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We now proceed to the case where D < M−1M . Recall that P is of Class I and includes the uniform point. Since
MI leakage is a concave function of P ∈ P , for any given mechanism Q the resulting worst case MI leakage is
the one corresponding to the uniform source distribution.
The resulting leakage can be lower bounded as
I(X; Xˆ) = H(X)−H(X|Xˆ)
≥ logM −H(D)−D log(M − 1), (24)
where (24) follows from Fano’s inequality. The lower bound in (24) can be achieved by the following mechanism:
Q(j|i) =
1−D, i = j,D
M−1 , i 6= j.
(25)
Lemma 6: For any Class II source set P , ∗IT(P, D) = 0 iff D ≥ D(M−1).
Proof: Let D ≥ D(M−1) and P ∗ ∈ P be the distribution achieving the maximum in definition of D(M−1)
in (9). Consider a mechanism that maps every input independently to the output element of P ∗ with the highest
probability. One can verify that the resulting distortion is D(M−1) ≤ D. Furthermore, one can also verify that for
this mechanism I(X; Xˆ) = 0.
We now show that no mechanism can achieve I(X; Xˆ) = 0, if D < D(M−1). Without loss of generality, let
P1 ≥ P2 ≥ . . . ≥ PM . Assume to the contrary that there exists a Qˆ achieving ∗IT(P, D) = 0 for some D < D(M−1).
Since I(X; Xˆ) = 0, P (xˆ|x) = p(xˆ) for all x. This in turn result in a distortion at least equal to ∑Mi=2 P ∗i , which
is equal to D(M−1), and thus, Qˆ cannot be (P, D)-valid.
IV. ILLUSTRATION OF RESULTS
We now illustrate our result by first giving examples of DP leakage for class I,II, and III sources as well as
comparisons between DP and MI leakage. The central question motivating this work is how partial knowledge of
the source distribution can be exploited to improve privacy-utility tradeoffs. We revisit our examples from Section
II-A to illustrate our theoretical results.
We first illustrate the reduction in leakage obtained when one goes beyond Class I source knowledge to Class II.
Figures 4 and 5 show the minimal DP leakage for P(6)II with M = 6 and P(10)II with M = 10, respectively. When
compared against Class I, for low distortion requirements there is no benefit to source knowledge, but in regimes
where a moderate level of distortion is tolerable, the data publisher can significantly decrease the privacy leakage
by taking advantage of the source set structure.
Yet another comparison made here is between Class II and CLass III source sets. Specifically, we expect the
leakage guarantees to diminish for Class III which is less structured than Class II and indeed we observe this
behavior. In fact, since the distortion guarantee for a Class III set also holds for its convex hull, eventually this hull
will contain the uniform distribution and the tradeoff will correspond to the Class I leakage.
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Fig. 4: DP leakage-distortion tradeoff for Class I, Class II, and Class III source sets with M = 6.
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P(10)II
P(10)III: b
P(10)III: a
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Fig. 5: DP leakage-distortion tradeoff for Class I, Class II, and Class III source sets with M = 10.
Finally, since DP is distribution-agnostic, the MI leakage is always upper bounded by the DP leakage. In Figures 6
and 7 we compare the MI and DP leakages for Class I and Class II sets. The MI leakage we use is the source-aware
worst-case mutual information.
These plots clearly show the convexity of the MI leakage and nonconvexity of the DP leakage as a function of
the distortion constraint D. The bounds only coincide at perfect privacy, where the output is independent of the
input, as indicated by Lemmas 5 and 6.
V. PROOFS
A. Proof of Lemma 1: quasi-convexity of DP(·) in Q
Proof: Based on the definition of quasi-convexity in [34, Section 3.4], it suffices to show that all the sub-
level sets of the function DP(·) are convex, i.e. if two different mechanisms Q1 and Q2 are -differentially private
August 2, 2018 DRAFT
16
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Distortion
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Le
ak
ag
e
M=10
DP
IT
Fig. 6: Differential Privacy vs Information Theoretic Leakage for Class I source sets and M = 10.
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Fig. 7: Differential Privacy vs Information Theoretic Leakage for P(10)II in Table II.
mechanisms for some finite , then their convex combination Qθ = θQ1 + (1 − θ)Q2, 0 < θ < 1, is also -
differentially private. Let x1 and x2 be two arbitrary input elements, and let xˆ be an arbitrary output element. We
have
Qθ(xˆ|x1) = θQ1(xˆ|x1) + (1− θ)Q2(xˆ|x1) (26a)
≤ θQ1(xˆ|x2)e + (1− θ)Q2(xˆ|x2)e (26b)
= eQθ(xˆ|x2). (26c)
Therefore, Qθ is also -differentially private, and thus DP(·) is a quasi-convex function.
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B. Proof of Lemma 3
Proof: We first show that for any optimal mechanism P with output support set of size N , where N > M +1,
there exists an optimal mechanism Q with output support set of size N − 1. It suffices to build Q from P by
merging the last two columns of P , i.e. adding them element-wise to make one single column. One can verify that
DP(Q) ≤ DP(P ) due to quasi-convexity of DP(·) shown in Lemma 1. Note that the resulting distortion is exactly
identical in both Q and P since their diagonal elements are equal.
We now show that for an optimal mechanism P with output support set of size M + 1, we can construct an
optimal mechanism Q with output support set of size M . Take columns M and M + 1 of P , and merge them
similar to the previous part. One can similarly verify DP(Q) ≤ DP(P ). We now check distortion feasibility. Note
that PM,M = 1 − DM , and therefore once PM,M+1 is added to it to obtain QM,M , the updated DM does not
increase, and therefore the total distortion under Q is at most equal to that of P . This holds for any distribution
point in P .
C. Proof of Lemma 2: Convexity of P
Proof: This is due to the fact that any (P, D)-valid mechanism should be also valid for any P¯ that is a convex
combination of distributions in P . More formally, suppose that a P¯ is in the form of ∑ri=1 θiP (i), where P (i) ∈ P ,
for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r}. Then, for a (P, D)-valid mechanism Q with distortion set {Di} we have
M∑
i=1
P¯iDi =
M∑
i=1
r∑
j=1
θjP
(j)
i Di (27a)
=
r∑
j=1
θj
M∑
i=1
P
(j)
i Di (27b)
≤
r∑
j=1
θjD = D. (27c)
Thus, Q is also a valid mechanism for P¯ and any P can be extended to its convex hull without loss of generality.
D. Proof of Lemma 4
Without loss of generality, let P1 ≥ P2 ≥ . . . ≥ PM for any P ∈ P . We now show that there exists an
optimal mechanism with Q with D1 ≤ D2 ≤ . . . ≤ DM . Let QˆXˆ|X be some optimal mechanism such that
DˆT (1) ≤ DˆT (2) ≤ . . . ≤ DˆT (M), for some permutation T . Then, let Q∗Xˆ|X = QˆT (Xˆ)|T (X). Clearly, we have
D∗1 ≤ D∗2 ≤ · · · ≤ D∗M and DP(Qˆ) = DP(Q∗). Finally, Q∗Xˆ|X is a (P, D)-valid mechanism, because:
M∑
i=1
PiD
∗
i ≤
M∑
i=1
PiD
∗
T−1(i) =
M∑
i=1
PiDˆi ≤ D. (28)
E. Proof of Theorem 1: Class I source sets
We now determine the optimal mechanism for Class I and show that it is indeed the conjectured mechanism
in [1]. From Lemma 2, we know that we can replace P with conv(P) without loss of generality, and henceforth
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our results hold for conv(P). We begin by assuming to the contrary that there exists a (P, D)-valid mechanism
QXˆ|X with lower risk guarantees than conjectured in [1], i.e. DP(Q) < log(M − 1) 1−DD for 0 < D < M−1M . For
any Q with DP(Q) < DP(QD), we require that QXˆ|X(j|i) > eDP(QD)QXˆ|X(j|j), for at least one pair (i, j), i 6= j.
Thus, by summing over all columns in QXˆ|X and recalling that e
DP(QD) = 1−DD (M − 1), we have
M =
M∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
Q(j|i) (29a)
>
M∑
j=1
Q(j|j) +∑
i 6=j
Q(i|i)
eDP(QD)
 (29b)
=
M∑
j=1
[
(1−Dj) +
(M − 1)−∑i 6=j Di
eDP(QD)
]
(29c)
= M −
M∑
j=1
Dj +
M(M − 1)
eDP(QD)
− M − 1
eDP(QD)
M∑
j=1
Dj (29d)
=
(
M − 1
eDP(QD)
+ 1
)M − M∑
j=1
Dj
 (29e)
=
(
1
1−D
)M − M∑
j=1
Dj
 . (29f)
Therefore
M∑
j=1
(1−Q(j|j)) =
M∑
j=1
Dj > MD. (30)
This, however, contradicts satisfying the distortion constraint for the uniform distribution.
F. Proof of Theorem 2: Class II source sets
We now prove Theorem 2, which exactly characterizes ∗DP(P, D) for the Class II source sets as introduced in
Definition 1. Recall that we defined distortion levels D(k) in (9) such that for any k, D(k) corresponds to the case
wherein at most k−1 letters of the input are suppressed and the output alphabet size is at least M−k, if D < D(k).
On the other hand, for D ≥ D(k), the output alphabet size may be suppressed by k or more elements. Through the
following lemma, we first prove that perfect privacy, i.e. zero leakage, can be achieved if and only if D ≥ D(M−1).
Lemma 7: ∗DP(P, D) = 0 if and only if D ≥ D(M−1).
Proof: We first prove the converse and show that ∗DP(P, D) = 0 only if D ≥ D(M−1). Let Q be a (P, D)-
valid mechanism with DP(Q) = 0. This implies all elements of the ith column have the same value, namely ai,
where 0 ≤ ai ≤ 1 and
∑M
i=1 ai = 1. Hence, the corresponding distortion values for Q are Di = 1− ai,∀i, where
0 ≤ Di ≤ 1 and
∑M
i=1Di = M − 1. Also, recall that for any distribution P , we have P1 ≥ P2 ≥ . . . ≥ PM .
Therefore, by replacing D1 with zero and Di, i > 1 with one, we can further lower bound the distortion as∑M
i=1 PiDi ≥
∑M
i=2 Pi. Note that Q is a (P, D)-valid mechanism, and therefore
∑M
i=2 Pi ≤ D. Taking the
maximum over all P ∈ P gives D(M−1) = maxP∈P
∑M
i=2 Pi ≤ D.
August 2, 2018 DRAFT
19
For proving the achievability, i.e. ∗DP(P, D) = 0 for D ≥ D(M−1), consider the mechanism with zero elements
everywhere except the first column where all entries are 1, i.e. Q(i|j) = 0, if i > 1, and Q(i|j) = 1, if i = 1. This
mechanism achieves ∗DP(P, D) = 0 and the distortion is bounded by
max
P∈P
M∑
i=1
PiDi = max
P∈P
M∑
i=2
Pi = D
(M−1) ≤ D. (31)
We now restrict ourselves to 0 ≤ D ≤ D(M−1), and in the following collection of lemmas we prove structural
conditions on the optimal mechanisms for Class II sources. We first describe the need for different distortion
levels, and then provide achievability and converse proofs. In particular, as the distortion increases there are specific
distortion values at which the support of output is allowed to shrink more. The following lemma captures this
observation precisely.
Lemma 8: For a k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M} and D < D(k), no (P, D)-valid mechanism can have an output support size
of less than or equal to (M − k).
Proof: For any P ∈ P , any mechanism with k or more all-zero columns results in an average distortion∑M
i=1 PiDi, which is strictly greater than
∑M
i=M−k+1 Pi because at least k elements in the set {Di}Mi=1 are equal
to one. Hence, for D < D(k), no mechanism with k or more all-zero columns can be (P, D)-valid.
Recall that without loss of generality, we can assume a given Class II source set has the ordering P1 ≥ P2 ≥ . . . ≥
PM , for any P ∈ P . Then, based on Lemma 4, there exists an optimal mechanism with D1 ≥ D2 ≥ . . . ≥ DM .
Using these lemmas, we now present a converse proof by exploiting the definition of differential privacy. We
provide a sequence of properties that any optimal mechanism must satisfy. We can therefore obtain a lower bound
on the leakage by minimizing parameters of those properties. Then, we present an achievable scheme by providing
a mechanism that achieves the minimum value given by the converse.
1) Converse for Theorem 2: We now prove a lower bound on ∗DP(P, D) for 0 < D < D(M−1). We first define
critical pairs in a matrix and then introduce a matrix coloring scheme to prove specific properties of the optimal
mechanism. We illustrate this definition and the properties using Figure 8.
Definition 7: For a mechanism QXˆ|X with DP(QXˆ|X) > 0, a critical pair in QXˆ|X is a pair of elements
{Q(k|i), Q(k|j)} in a non-zero column, such that QXˆ|X(k|i) = exp(DP(QXˆ|X))QXˆ|X(k|j).
Note that there exists at least one critical pair, but in general if there are multiple critical pairs in different columns
of a matrix Q, they may have different values. However, their ratio needs to be equal to exp(DP(Q)). Furthermore,
note that not all columns may have a critical pair. However, the maximal ratio of two elements in any column is
at most exp(DP(Q)).
We color the entries of non-zero columns of any given matrix Q black, white or red as follows:
• An element is colored black if it is the larger element in a critical pair.
• An element is colored red if it is the smaller element in a critical pair.
• All other elements are colored white.
Remark 7: Note that if a black element is decreased (or a red is increased), either the DP(·) of the matrix has
to decrease, or that element can no longer be black (red).
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Our proof involves manipulating the elements of Q while maintaining it as a valid mechanism: any change in Q
that neither increases a black element nor decreases a red element keeps DP(QXˆ|X) at most equal to its previous
value.
Definition 8: For any 0 ≤ k ≤ M − 1, let Q(k)(P, D) be the set of all (P, D)-valid mechanisms with k all-
zero columns. Also let Q∗(k)(P, D) ⊂ Q(k)(P, D) be the set of mechanisms with the smallest DP(·) among all
mechanisms in Q(k)(P, D).
Recall from Section II that Q(jmin : jmax|imin : imax) is the sub-matrix of Q induced by rows from imin to imax and
columns from jmin to jmax. This notation is used extensively throughout the following lemmas and propositions.
Lemma 9: For a given 0 < D < D(M−1) and 0 ≤ k ≤ M − 1, there exists a Qk
Xˆ|X ∈ Q∗
(k)
(P, D) with the
distortions D1 ≤ D2 ≤ . . . ≤ DM such that
DP(Q
k
Xˆ|X) = log(M − 1− k)
1−
∑M−k
i=2 Di
M−1−k
D1
. (32)
Proof: Denote those mechanisms Q∗(k)(P, D) that have the smallest ∑Mi=1Di by Q∗(k)MS (P, D), where MS
in the subscript stands for “Minimum Sum”. Through five sequential claims, we now show that there exists a
QXˆ|X ∈ Q∗
(k)
MS (P, D) with a specific color structure as shown in Figure 8 and DP(QXˆ|X) is given by (32).
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Fig. 8: For Class II source sets, optimal mechanisms with k all-zero columns have at most one non-black diagonal
element, while all other non-zero off diagonal elements are either red or white.
For any mechanism QXˆ|X with k all-zero columns (or in other words, with k of its Dis being equal to 1),
without loss of generality we can assume that columns M −k+ 1 to M are the all-zero ones due to Lemma 4. Let
Q(1 : (M − k)|1 : (M − k)) and Q(1 : (M − k)|(M − k + 1) : M) be sub-matrices of any given Q. Then there
exists a QXˆ|X ∈ Q∗
(k)
MS (P, D) that satisfies the following claims sequentially. In other words, each claim i states
that there exists at least one QXˆ|X ∈ Q∗
(k)
MS (P, D) among all the ones satisfying the previous claims {1, . . . , i−1},
such that the statement of claim i is true.
Claim 1: No row is all black (or all red) in Q(1 : (M − k)|1 : M).
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Proof: Assume the contrary that the ith row in Q(1 : (M−k)|1 : M) is all black for any QXˆ|X ∈ Q∗
(k)
MS (P, D).
Consider the ratio DP(Q) = log
Q(1|i)
Q(1|j) , where Q(1|j) is the red element associated with Q(1|i) which is black,
i.e. Q(1|j) and Q(1|i) form critical pairs. Also note that for any other 2 < l ≤ M − k, Q(l|i) ≥ Q(l|j). Now, if
DP(Q) > 0, we have
1 = Q(1|i) +
M−k∑
l=2
Q(l|i) > Q(1|j) +
M−k∑
l=2
Q(l|j) = 1, (33)
which is a contradiction. Otherwise, if DP(Q) = 0, by Lemma 7 D ≥ D(M−1), which is also a contradiction to our
assumption of 0 < D < D(M−1) in the beginning of converse proof. The proof for no row with all red elements
is similar.
Claim 2: All the off-diagonal elements of a row in Q(1 : (M − k)|1 : M) have the same color.
Proof: Take an arbitrary mechanism QXˆ|X ∈ Q∗
(k)
MS (P, D) that Q(1 : (M − k)|1 : M) satisfies Claim 1. Fix
a row i, and let the number of off-diagonal elements in row i of Q(1 : (M − k)|1 : M) with each of the colors
black, white and red be nB , nW and nR respectively, where nB + nW + nR = M − 1 − k. If only one of nR,
nW or nB is non-zero, then the claim is satisfied. We split the remaining scenarios into two cases and show that
in each it is sufficient to make all off-diagonal elements of the ith row white.
• If nR, nB > 0, then there exists an arbitrarily small δ > 0 such that each of the off-diagonal black elements can
be decreased by δnB , and each of the off-diagonal red elements can be increased by
δ
nR
. Consider a Q′ which
is identical to Q everywhere except for a segment of the i-th row Q′(1 : (M−k)|i). For 1 ≤ j ≤M−k, j 6= i,
let Q′(j|i) = Q(j|i) − δnB if Q(j|i) is black, Q′(j|i) = Q(j|i) + δnR if Q(j|i) is red, and Q′(j|i) = Q(j|i)
if Q(j|i) is white. Note that it does not matter if nW = 0 or not, because the white off-diagonal elements
Q′(1 : (M − k)|i) are not changed.
• If nR = 0, nW , nB > 0 (or nB = 0, nW , nR > 0), then there exists an arbitrarily small δ > 0 such that
each of off-diagonal white elements can be increased (or decreased) by δnW , and each of off-diagonal black
elements (or red elements) can be decreased (or increased) by δnB (or
δ
nR
). Consider a Q′ which is identical
to Q everywhere except for Q′(1 : (M − k)|i). For 1 ≤ j ≤ M − k, j 6= i, let Q′(j|i) = Q(j|i) − δnB if
Q(j|i) is black and Q′(j|i) = Q(j|i) + δnW if Q(j|i) is white (or Q′(j|i) = Q(j|i) + δnR if Q(j|i) is red and
Q′(j|i) = Q(j|i)− δnW if Q(j|i) is white), and Q′(j|i) = Q(j|i) elsewhere.
In both cases Q′ has the same off-diagonal row sum and the same set of {Di}Mi=1 as Q, but for sufficiently small
δ, Q′ is still a valid row stochastic matrix and none of the elements in Q′(1 : (M −k)|1 : M) become 1 or 0. Thus,
Q′ would still be a (P, D)-valid mechanism. Besides, all off-diagonal elements in row i of Q′, i /∈ {a1, a2, · · · , ak},
are white: If not we would have a smaller DP(Q′Xˆ|X) due to Remark 7, which contradicts our first assumption that
QXˆ|X ∈ Qk
∗
(P, D). In this construction, all off-diagonal elements of Q′(1 : (M − k)|1 : M) in rows other than
i are colored the same as Q without affecting the average distortion, while keeping DP(Q′) ≤ DP(Q) and thus
Q′ ∈ Q∗(k)MS (P, D). This operation can be done for each row i repeatedly, to get the final Q′ to satisfy the claim.
Remark 8: As a result of Claims 1 and 2, all the off-diagonal elements in Q(1 : (M − k)|(M − k+ 1) : M) are
white.
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Claim 3: If a diagonal element in Q(1 : (M − k)|1 : (M − k)) is not black then all off-diagonal elements of
Q(1 : (M − k)|1 : (M − k)) in the same row are red.
Proof: Take an arbitrary QXˆ|X ∈ Q∗
(k)
MS (P, D) satisfying Claims 1 and 2, and for some 1 ≤ i ≤M−k suppose
Q(i|i) is red or white. By Claim 2, all elements in the set {Q(j|i) : j 6= i, 1 ≤ j ≤ M − k} have the same color.
Assume to the contrary that they are not all red, so they are all black or white. Consider a Q′ which is equal to Q,
except in Q′(1 : (M − k)|i) where Q′(i|i) = Q(i|i) + δ and Q′(j|i) = Q(j|i)− δM−k−1 for j 6= i, 1 ≤ j ≤M − k.
For sufficiently small δ > 0 this is also a (P, D)-valid mechanism. Although DP(Q′Xˆ|X) remains unchanged due
to Remark 7, we have
M∑
i=1
D′i =
M∑
i=1
(1−Q′(i|i)) <
M∑
i=1
(1−Q(i|i)) =
M∑
i=1
Di, (34)
where D′i is the distortion of i
th element under Q′. This clearly contradicts the assumption that Q ∈ Q∗(k)MS (P, D).
Claim 4: There is at most one non-black element on the diagonal of Q(1 : (M − k)|1 : (M − k)).
Proof: Take an arbitrary QXˆ|X ∈ Q∗
(k)
MS (P, D) satisfying all previous claims. Assume the contrary that there
are at least two non-black diagonal elements Q(i|i) and Q(j|j), (i 6= j, i, k ≤M−k). Thus, Q(i|j) is red by Claim
3, which implies that there exists a k 6= j where Q(i|k) is black, because there should be a black element for each
red element in a column. However, k 6= i because we already know that Q(i|i) is non-black. Thus, Q(i|k) has to
be an off-diagonal black element in Q(1 : (M − k)|1 : M), which is contradictory to our first assumption of Q
satisfying all previous claims, including Claim 1 and 2. Therefore, at most one diagonal element is non-black.
Claim 5: The only possible non-black element along the diagonal of Q(1 : (M − k)|1 : (M − k)) is the one
corresponding to the smallest, or one of the smallest Dis.
Proof: Take an arbitrary QXˆ|X ∈ Q∗
(k)
MS (P, D) satisfying all previous claims. Let the diagonal element in row
i, 1 ≤ i ≤ M − k, be non-black. We show that for any j 6= i, 1 ≤ j ≤ M − k, Dˆj ≥ Dˆi. By Claim 3, we know
that any other off-diagonal entry in row i of Q(1 : (M − k)|1 : (M − k)), including Q(j|i) is red. We also know
that Q(j|j) is black and other entries in row j of Q(1 : (M − k)|1 : (M − k)), including Q(i|j), are either all
red or all white due to Claims 1 and 2. Thus, for all 1 ≤ k ≤M − k other than i or j we have Q(k|j) ≥ Q(k|i)
because Q(k|j) is either red or white, and Q(k|i) is red, where both of them are in the same column. Since any
row has to sum up to one, summing over rows i and j results in
Q(j|j) +Q(i|j) ≤ Q(i|i) +Q(j|i). (35)
Besides, since Q(j|j) is black, Q(j|i) is either red or white, Q(i|j) is red, and Q(i|i) is either red or white, we
have
Q(j|j)
Q(j|i) >
Q(i|i)
Q(i|j) . (36)
We now show that
1− Dˆj = Q(j|j) ≤ Q(i|i) = 1− Dˆi. (37)
Assume the contrary that Q(j|j) > Q(i|i). Thus, by (35) we have
0 < Q(j|j)−Q(i|i) ≤ Q(j|i)−Q(i|j), (38)
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which means Q(j|j)−Q(i|i)Q(j|i)−Q(i|j) ≤ 1. However, (36) shows that
Q(j|j)−Q(i|i)
Q(j|i)−Q(i|j) ≥
Q(j|j)
Q(j|i) >
Q(i|i)
Q(i|j) ≥ 0, (39)
which means
Q(j|j)−Q(i|i) > Q(j|i)−Q(i|j) (40)
because eDP(Q) = Q(j|j)Q(j|i) > 1, which contradicts (38).
The claims above imply that for D1 as one of the smallest {Di}M−ki=1 , all the other diagonal elements are black,
and the non-zero elements in the row corresponding to D1 are all red. This implies that for each red Q(j|1), j 6= i,
there exists a diagonal element 1 −Dj in the same column j which is eDP(Q) times bigger than the red element
Q(j|1). The proof is completed by summing over row 1 entries and solving for DP.
Let 0 ≤ k ≤M −1. Lemma 9 provides a formula for the optimal DP(·) among (P, D)-valid mechanisms with k
all-zero columns, in terms of their corresponding distortion values {Di}M−ki=1 . Besides, no mechanism with at least
k all-zero columns can be (P, D)-valid for D < D(k) due to Lemma 8. Thus, for any k and D(k) ≤ D ≤ D(k+1),
a lower bound on ∗DP(P, D) can be derived by taking the minimum over 0 ≤ l ≤ k and all (P, D)-valid sets of
{Di}Mi=1 that satisfy (M −1−k)
1−
∑M−k
i=2
Di
M−1−k
D1
≥ 1, or equivalently ∑M−ki=1 Di ≤M −1. Moreover, for a mechanism
with k all-zero columns we have Di = 1 for i > M − k, and thus {Di}Mi=1 can be (P, D)-valid if and only if
{Di}M−ki=1 is (P, D − D(k))-valid, i.e.
∑M−k
i=1 PiDi ≤ D − D(k). This result in (11) and completes the proof of
the lower bound in Theorem 2.
We now proceed to the special case where D < D(1). For proving ∗DP(P, D) ≥ log(M − 1) 1−DD , it suffices to
show that ∗
(0)
DP (P, D) is greater than or equal to log(M − 1) 1−DD . We need the following Lemma.
Lemma 10: Let {ai}ni=1, {bi}ni=1, and {a′i}ni=1 be a collection of real numbers between 0 and 1, such that
n∑
i=1
ai =
n∑
i=1
a′i, (41)
and b1 ≤ b2 ≤ . . . ≤ bn. If a′1 ≥ a1 and a′i ≤ ai for i = 2, 3, · · · , n, then
n∑
i=1
a′ibi ≤
n∑
i=1
aibi. (42)
Then, assume the contrary that for some D < D(1), all mechanisms in Q∗(P, D) achieve a strictly smaller
DP(·) than log(M − 1) 1−DD . From Lemma 9 we know that there exists an optimal mechanism QXˆ|X with the set
of distortions {Di}Mi=1, such that DP(Q) is given by (32), and without loss of generality D1 ≤ D2 ≤ · · · ≤ DM
due to Lemma 4. Hence, the contrary assumption is that there exists an optimal QXˆ|X such that
∗DP(Q, D) = DP(QXˆ|X) = log(M − 1)
1−
∑M
i=2Di
M−1
D1
(43a)
< log(M − 1)1−D
D
. (43b)
Thus:
(1−D)D1 + D
M − 1
M∑
i=2
Di > D. (44)
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On the other hand, since QXˆ|X is supposed to satisfy the distortion constraint for any P ∈ P , including P ∗ =
argmaxP∈PPM , we have
M∑
i=1
P ∗i Di = P
∗
1D1 +
M∑
i=2
P ∗i Di (45a)
= (1−D)D1 + D
M − 1
M∑
i=2
Di ≤ D, (45b)
where (45b) is in view of Lemma 10 and the fact that D ≤ D(1) implies P ∗i ≥ DM−1 for i = 2, 3, · · · ,M and
P ∗1 ≤ 1−D. Obviously (45b) contradicts (44). Thus, for 0 ≤ D ≤ D(1), we have
∗DP(Q, D) ≥ log(M − 1)
1−D
D
. (46)
2) Achievability for Theorem 2: First, we show that for 0 ≤ D < D(1), the optimal leakage in (10) is achievable.
Consider the following mechanism
Q(j|i) =
1−D, i = j,D
M−1 , i 6= j.
(47)
Observe that Q is (P, D)-valid and DP(Q) = log(M − 1) 1−DD . Therefore, the lower bound in (46) is tight and
∗DP(P, D) = log(M − 1) 1−DD for 0 ≤ D < D(1).
We now prove that the lower bound in (10) is achievable for D(1) ≤ D < D(M−1). To this end, we construct the
following mechanism. For any given 0 ≤ k ≤M − 1 and the optimal set {D∗i }M−1i=1 in (11), consider the following
mechanism.
Q(k)
∗
(j|i) =

1−D∗i , i = j ≤M − k,
Di
1−D∗j∑
l 6=i 1−D∗l , i 6= j, i, j < M − k,
Q(k)
∗
(j|M − k), i > M − k, j ≤M − k,
0, j > M − k.
(48)
We now verify that DP(Q(k)
∗
) = (M − 1− k) 1−
∑M−k
i=2
D∗i
M−1−k
D∗1
. Since each of the last k rows in the above matrix are
equal to the (M − k)th row, and the last k columns are all equal to zero, it suffices to check the DP(·) for the
square matrix formed by the first M − k rows and columns. The ratio of any two elements in the same column in
Q(k)
∗
belongs to the set {c1, c2, . . . , cM−k}, where
ci = (M − 1− k)
1−
∑
j 6=iDj
M−1−k
Di
. (49)
From Lemma 4 we have that D1 ≤ . . . ≤ DM−k, which in turn implies that for any 0 ≤ j ≤M − k:
(M − 1− k)1−
∑M−k
i=2 Di
M−1−k
D1
≥ (M − 1− k)1−
∑
i6=j Di
M−1−k
Dj
. (50)
Therefore, DP(Q(k)
∗
) = (M − 1− k) 1−
∑M−k
i=2
Di
M−1−k
D1
.
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G. Proof of Theorem 3: Class III source sets
Proof: Recall that a Class III source set P can be written as a union of Class II source sets as P = ∪
T∈TP
P|T .
Furthermore, each of these partitions P|T can be mapped to S0 with the appropriate permutation to get P|T . We
write the intersection and union of the mapped partitions as P∩ and P∪, respectively. Since P∩ and P∪ are Class
II source sets, we can compute the optimal leakage and the corresponding mechanism for these two sets. Moreover,
mapping P∪ and P∩ back into the original partitions results in two sets PUB and PLB that contain and are contained
in P , respectively.
Formally, let
PLB = ∪T∈TPT−1(P∩), (51a)
PUB = ∪T∈TPT−1(P∪). (51b)
For the P shown in Figure 2 and the corresponding P∪ and P∩ in Figure 3, Figure 9 below illustrates the PLB
and PUB.
P1
P3
P2
𝒮0
𝑈𝐵
P1
P3
P2
𝒮0
𝐿𝐵
Fig. 9: A source set P and its folded versions.
Recall that for two sets P1 and P2, if P1 ⊆ P2, then ∗DP(P1, D) ≥ ∗DP(P2, D). Thus, it suffices to show the
following:
(i) PLB ⊆ P ⊆ PUB, and
(ii) The optimal DP leakage for PLB and PUB are given by
∗DP(PLB, D) = ∗DP:III(P∩, D, TP), (52)
∗DP(PUB, D) = ∗DP:III(P∪, D, TP), (53)
where ∗DP:III(·) is defined in (17).
Proof of (i): For each T ∈ TP , since P∩ ⊆ P|T we have T−1(P∩) ⊆ P|T . After taking union over all T ∈ TP ,
we have PLB ⊆ P . One can immediately show that P ⊆ PUB.
Proof of (ii): We first prove (52). A similar argument proves (53). Recall that PLB = ∪T∈TPT−1(P∩), and thus,
for any P ∈ P∩ and T ∈ TP we have T−1(P ) ∈ PLB. This means that for any given (PLB, D)-valid mechanism
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QXˆ|X , QT (Xˆ)|T (X) is also (PLB, D)-valid and DP(QXˆ|X) = DP(QT (Xˆ)|T (X)). Since DP(Q) is a quasi-convex
function of Q due to Lemma 1, there exists an optimal mechanism achieving ∗DP(PLB, D) for which
DT (i) = Di, for any T ∈ TP , i = 1, . . . ,M. (54)
Hence, it suffices to search over only those (P∩, D)-valid mechanism that satisfy (54) in order to find (k)∗DP (PLB, D).
Furthermore, since P∩ is a Class II source set, we can use the results from Theorem 2. We now show ∗DP(PLB, D) =
∗DP:III(P∩, D, TP).
First consider the case where D ≥ M−1M . Clearly, choosing Q(i|j) = 1M achieves ∗DP(PLB, D) = 0, while the
distortion constraint is also satisfied.
For D < M−1M , similar to the proof for Theorem 2, we first restrict the set of mechanisms to those that have a
fixed number k of all-zero columns, k = 0, 1, . . . ,M − 1. For any such k, the optimal leakage is given by (18),
where the third constraint is a result of (54). Note that (18) results from the addition of the constraint in (54) to the
constraints in (11) for a Class II source set. The optimal ∗DP(PLB, D) is then the minimum of (k)
∗
DP:III(P∩, D, TP)
over all k, resulting in (17).
Finally, for D < D(1), analogous to Theorem 2, we can still show that the optimal mechanism is symmetric.
Recall that for a Class II source set P∩ and D < D(1), the optimal mechanism achieving ∗DP(P∩, D) is symmetric,
and thus, does not violate (54). Hence, we have
∗DP:III(P∩, D, TP) = ∗DP(P∩, D) = log
(
(M − 1)1−D
D
)
.
Note that in contrast to Theorem 2, we no longer have distortion thresholds D(2), D(3), . . . , D(M−2), where in
each of them only mechanisms with specific number of all-zero columns are allowed. This is due to the constraint
in (54), which may not allow a gradual shrinking of output support set.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have quantified the privacy-utility tradeoffs for a dataset under different assumptions on
distribution knowledge (classes) and for Hamming distortion using differential privacy as the leakage metric. The
guarantees we can make under differential privacy are stronger than those under mutual information-based measures
of privacy leakage: DP leakage is lower bounded by MI leakage. We divide source sets into three classes. For Class
I the optimal mechanism is symmetric. For Class II achieving optimal leakage involves reducing the output space
as the distortion increases. For Class III sets we can use Class II results to develop upper and lower bounds on the
leakage.
Our results show that symmetric distortion, such as randomized response [27], is optimal when very little is
known about the source distribution or when the distortion requirement is very strict. In cases where the source
distribution is partially known, data publishers can take advantage of this to tailor a local privacy mechanism to
guarantee lower privacy leakage for the same distortion, or lower distortion for the same privacy leakage. These
gains can be significant if quite a lot is known about the source, such as Class II sources, and degrades as less
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and less information is known. These results imply that domain knowledge or public data should be used when
designing mechanisms for publishing private data.
There are several interesting questions which we leave for future work. Obviously, a full characterization of
Class III sources would be welcome, but the techniques here should extend directly to general discrete distortion
measures (linear and nonlinear). Extensions to continuous source distributions may be trickier, but perhaps a starting
point would be distributions with bounded support. Finally, understanding the implications of this simple model to
categorical and hierarchically categorized data would help build insight into designing practical source-aware data
release mechanisms.
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